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Commission v. Poland marks a showdown in the EU’s current “value crisis”.
Its possible results, however, seem rather predictable: With Advocate General
Tanchev’s recent opinion and the Court’s orders rendered in the case, it appears
very likely that the CJEU will find Poland in breach of Article 19(1)(2) TEU. Further,
the Court seems to have already prepared the legal grounds for adjudicating the
case in its seminal ASJP-judgment.
Yet, the latter is still surrounded by several uncertainties. In this decision, the
Court interpreted Article 19(1)(2) TEU as establishing an obligation of judicial
independence for every Member State court that has the abstract power to apply
EU law – even if it does not actually apply it in the specific case at hand. Thus,
Article 19(1)(2) TEU reaches de facto every Member State court. Two points seem
particularly difficult to grasp: First, the Court did not elaborate on the complex
relationship of Article 19(1)(2) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter. And second, it is
not entirely clear how it justified the immense scope it has accorded to Article 19(1)
(2) TEU. The CJEU’s reasoning seems to oscillate between well-known effet utile
considerations and a new, ground-breaking rationale – the judicial applicability of the
Union’s common values enshrined in Article 2 TEU.
Commission v. Poland gives the Court not only the opportunity to put ASJP
into practice but also to clarify the doctrinal framework for finally addressing the
developments in “backsliding” Member States under EU law. This contribution will
shed some light on these two uncertainties, suggest ways of how the Court could
resolve them and explore the potential repercussions for the EU legal order.
I. Extending the Charter through the backdoor of
Article 19(1)(2) TEU?
In ASJP, the Court relied on Article 19(1)(2) TEU – not Article 47 CFR – in order
to address judicial independence in a Member State. Pursuant to Article 19(1)(2)
TEU, “Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal
protection in the fields covered by Union law”, which includes guaranteeing an
independent judiciary. Why did the CJEU not rely on the equivalent Article 47 CFR
(on this equivalence, see e.g. Berlioz, para. 44)? Probably because the case at
hand (and by the way also the respective Polish reforms in Commission v. Poland)
fit uneasily with the scope of the Charter under Article 51(1) CFR. According to the
Court in ASJP, however, Article 19(1)(2) TEU applies “irrespective of whether the
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Member States are implementing Union law, within the meaning of Article 51(1) of
the Charter”. Unfortunately, the exact meaning of this sentence remains obscure:
Does it imply that Article 19(1)(2) TEU has a different or even a broader scope of
application than the Charter?1)For such an interpretation, see e.g. K. Lenaerts, On
Judicial Independence and the Quest for National, Supranational and Transnational
Justice, in: G. Selvik et al. (eds.), The Art of Judicial Reasoning (Springer, 2019),
155, 163: “the scope of application of the second subparagraph Article 19(1) TEU
is not the same as that of Article 47 of the Charter. The former applies to ‘the fields
covered by EU law’, whilst the latter applies to national measures implementing
EU law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter”; see further the opinion
of Advocate General Tanchev: “a separate assessment of the material scope of
the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, and of Article 47 of the Charter
is required”. Instead of further clarifying this position, however, he completed his
assessment at the procedural level: The Commission has the burden of proof to
establish a violation of EU law (including its applicability in the first place) and failed
to put forward any arguments concerning the Charter’s application.
1. The “shadow” of Article 19(1)(2) TEU
Prima facie, any difference in scope between Article 19 TEU and the Charter seems
odd. As Koen Lenaerts formulated so famously with regard to the scope of the
Charter under Article 51(1) CFR:
“Just as an object defines the contours of its shadow, the scope of EU law
determines that of the Charter.”2)K. Lenaerts/J.A. Guttièrez-Fons, The Place of the
Charter in the EU Constitutional Edifice, in: Steve Peers et al. (eds.), The EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart, 2014), 1559, 1567.
If the Charter follows the scope of Union law (and ergo that of Article 19(1)(2) TEU)
like a shadow, one would expect the Charter to reach as far as Article 19(1)(2)
does.3)This point has been advanced by M. Claes/M. Bonelli, Judicial serendipity:
how Portuguese judges came to the rescue of the Polish judiciary, European
Constitutional Law Review 14 (2018), 622, 630-631.  This view is supported by the
Court’s stance in Åkerberg Fransson: “situations cannot exist which are covered
… by European Union law without those fundamental rights being applicable.”
Admittedly, this position has been subsequently watered down in the Court’s
case law: The shadow of EU law has begun to develop a certain “penumbra”.
Yet one situation has remained crystal clear: The Charter applies when EU law
creates a “specific obligation” for the Member States (see Hernández, para. 35 and
Siragusa,paras. 26-27).The creation of such “specific obligations” to guarantee an
independent judiciary was exactly the reason for the Court’s interpretation of Article
19(1)(2) in ASJP.
In this sense, Article 19(1)(2) TEU could be understood as defining the scope of
Union law within the meaning of Article 51(1) CFR. According to ASJP, Article 19(1)
(2) TEU creates an obligation of judicial independence for every national court which
is abstractly empowered to apply EU law. Letting the Charter and Article 47 CFR
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“follow” the scope of Article 19(1)(2) TEU would imply, therefore, that Article 47 (and
the Charter as a whole) is applicable in virtually every procedure before a Member
State court.
2. Far reaching implications
Such an interpretation would entail an enormous extension of the Charter’s scope.
Before ASJP, a lack of effective judicial protection in procedures concerning
solely national law was deemed insufficient to trigger Article 47 CFR. The subject
matter needed to be EU law in the specific case at hand (see e.g. Maurin, paras.
11-12). After ASJP, an individual can in theory rely on Article 47 CFR whenever
it is confronted with a judge lacking the necessary degree of independence. This
would render the organisation of the whole national judiciary justiciable for individual
actions under EU law.
Such an extension of the Charter’s scope was probably neither the drafters’ nor
the judges’ intention. In a speech held immediately after ASJP, Judge von Danwitz
emphasised that the recourse to Article 19(1)(2) TEU was meant as a way “to
resist the temptation to go beyond the limits of the scope of the Charter as set out
in the first paragraph of its Article 51”. The only way out of this dilemma seems to
be an eventual departure from the Court’s clear-cut stance in Åkerberg Fransson.
The CJEU could draw a line between two dimensions: On one hand, a structural,
objective rule of law dimension under Article 19 TEU which is concerned with the EU
judicial system as a whole; on the other hand, an individual, subjectivefundamental
rights dimension concerned with individual fundamental rights violations under the
Charter (and thus Article 47 CFR). Both dimensions would preserve an independent
nature, rationale and function justifying a diverging scope.
Yet there are good arguments for the Charter’s application in situations covered
by Article 19(1)(2) TEU. First, the EU legal order relied from its very beginning on
the “vigilance of individuals … to protect their rights”. Empowering the individual
to enforce Treaty obligations is therefore not alien to EU law. In its recent L.M.
judgement, the Court seems to have taken a further step into this direction. It allowed
for the general possibility to postpone a European Arrest Warrant when judicial
independence in the issuing Member State is at stake. According to the Court, an
individual can challenge its surrender to such a Member State based on Article 47
CFR. This has been interpreted as empowering “individuals for defending European
values” (see here). Second, the Court has already begun to increasingly expand
the scope of the Charter to situations in which EU law does not concretely apply in
the specific case at hand. In a recent line of cases, the CJEU applied the Charter
to horizontalsituations between individuals in which EU law (a directive) did not
actually apply.4)Directives do not apply horizontally between two private individuals,
see e.g. Bauer, paras. 76-77, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, paras. 66-76. For the
Charter to be applicable it was sufficient that the “field [was] covered by EU law” (see
Egenberger, para. 76, Bauer, para. 85, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, para. 74 and
Cresco Investigation, para. 76). Interestingly, this is exactly the same wording we
find in Article 19(1)(2) TEU as well.
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Eventually, the Court will have to make a decision: Either it will have to further
attenuate Åkerberg Fransson and accept that there might be many diverging and
different scopes in EU law; or it might opt for expanding the Charter’s application
in national court proceedings. To say it bluntly: Either the Court sacrifices Åkerberg
Fransson or it puts Article 51(1) CFR at risk. It cannot have it both ways.
II. Explaining the broad scope of application of
Article 19(1)(2) TEU
The second major issue of ASJP was the massive extension of Article 19(1)(2)
TEU’s scope. According to the Court’s interpretation, Article 19(1)(2) TEU creates
obligations for every Member State court which is potentially in the situation of
applying EU law. This means de facto every Member State court. A thorough
analysis of ASJP reveals two (complementary?) rationales justifying this ample
scope reaching far into domestic territory.
1. A recourse to the effet utile …
Prima facie, the Court seems to employ the well-established effet utile rationale.
First, it refers to the functioning of the preliminary reference procedure under Article
267 TFEU. National courts have an indispensable position in the effective and
uniform application of EU law. As they are obliged to apply EU law in the respective
Member States even where it may conflict with national law, they are considered
to be the first “Union courts” (see e.g. Simmenthal or Les Verts). However, such
a system cannot work if Member State courts are not independent.Second, the
rationale behind Article 19(1)(2) TEU supports the Courts findings. Instead of further
lowering the demanding locus standi criteria for individual actions before the CJEU
(see Article 263(4) TFEU), the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty opted for a strengthened
decentralised judicial system based on both the CJEU and Member State courts.
The very function of Article 19(1)(2) TEU is to ensure that this diffused judicial
system works and that no protection gaps arise. This necessarily enables the CJEU
to specify and harmonise Member State provisions regarding judicial remedies and
procedures (see e.g. Unibet, paras. 40-43 and Factortame I, paras. 19 et seq.).
These two considerations seem to strongly indicate that ASJP is not the tectonic
shift “reconfiguring the EU constitutional order”.Instead, the CJEU could be seen as
applying its well-known effet utile argument.
2. … or rather a recourse to “values”?
Yet there is another, potentially ground-breaking justification for the ample scope of
Article 19(1)(2) TEU. Due to their open- and vagueness, it has been highly debated
whether Article 2 TEU values create any legal obligations for the Member States or
whether they unfold any justiciable legal effects. As such, it was not clear whether
Article 2 TEU can be relied upon against developments in the Member States
challenging the Union’s very foundations. At the crucial passage of ASJP, the Court
now states that
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“Article 19 TEU […] gives concrete expression to the value of the rule of law stated in
Article 2.”
In establishing this connection, the Court seems to render Article 2 TEU judicially
applicable. It implicitly rejected an isolated, direct application of Article 2 TEU
and opted for a “combined approach”. The CJEU uses a provision containing a
specific obligation to “operationalise” the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU. They
are judicially applied via a more specific provision translating them into specific legal
obligations (for first articulations of this idea, see already here and here).
What is the effect of this approach? At first glance, it could lead to a limitation
of Article 2 TEU to the specific provision’s scope. Accordingly, Article 2 TEU
operationalised by Article 19(1)(2) TEU would be limited to the latter’s scope: “fields
covered by Union law”. This limitation of Article 2 TEU’s effect by its specific carrier-
provision, however, seems to severely neglect the overarching importance of Article
2 TEU and its unrestricted scope of application. The scope of Article 2 is not limited
to the scope of application of the Treaties: The Member States are bound by it even
in areas not covered by any (other) Union law.5)For a rare agreement, see European
Commission, A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, COM(2014) 158,
5; Council of the European Union, Opinion of the Legal Service, 10296/14, para.
17; see already European Convention, Praesidium: Draft of Articles 1 to 16 of the
Constitutional Treaty, CONV 528/03, p. 11. To allow a provision of primary law to
unilaterally prevail over Article 2 TEU would frustrate its overarching importance and
probably not conform with the methods of systematic interpretation.
And indeed, the CJEU does not seem to limit the scope of Article 2 TEU
operationalised by Article 19(1)(2) TEU to the “fields covered by Union law”.
In ASJP, it established standards for any Member State court. How can this
extended scope of Article 19(1)(2) TEU be explained? According to my reading,
the interplay of Article 2 TEU with another more specific provision creates a
“mutual amplification”: The specific provision of EU law (here Article 19 TEU)
translates Article 2 TEU into a specific legal obligation. At the same time, the specific
provision is “charged” with the general nature of Article 2 TEU. This “charging” effect
also pertains to the specific provision’s scope. In this cumulating interplay, each
contributes what the other lacks – specificity and unrestricted scope. As such, the
combined provision of Article 2 TEU and its “carrier” creates legal obligations for the
Member States even beyond the scope of (any other) Union law (see in detail, here).
In this sense, the logic of a “mutual amplification” kills two birds with one stone: It
allows for the judicial applicability of Art. 2 TEU and its application beyond the scope
of (any other) Union law. Eventually, such a mutual amplification could be operated
with any other provision of EU law giving “concrete expression” to a value enshrined
in Article 2 TEU and containing a specific obligation for the Member States. In
order to not upset the federal equilibrium, however, such an approach needs to be
accompanied by carefully construed limitations (for such limitations, see here).
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III. Commission v. Poland: A stepping stone towards
a strong “Union of values”?
As seen above, ASJP did not only establish a framework for addressing illiberal
developments in the Member States threatening the Union’s common values (at
least as far as judicial independence is concerned); it also leaves us with several
uncertainties clouding the reach, justification and construction of these Union law
responses.
Yet there is a pressing need to clarify the legal framework under which legal actions
against “backsliding” Member States can take place – especially when the link to EU
law is weak or difficult to establish. Further Commission procedures directed against
Poland (see here and here) as well as Polish judges seeking the support of the Court
depend on such clarity. Many Polish courts have submitted preliminary references
to the CJEU concerning the retirement ages and the new disciplinary regime.6)On
the Polish retirement ages for judges, see Zak#ad Ubezpiecze# Spo#ecznych
(C-522/18); Unipart (C-668/18); on the new Polish disciplinary chamber and the
influence of President of Republic/Minister of Justice on its composition, see Krajowa
Rada S#downictwa (Indépendance de la chambre disciplinaire de la Cour suprême)
(C-585/18), CP (Indépendance de la chambre disciplinaire de la Cour suprême)
(C-624/18); DO (Indépendance de la chambre disciplinaire de la Cour suprême)
(C-625/18); Krajowa Rada S#downictwa (C-537/18); Krajowa Rada S#downictwa
(C-824/18); on the disciplinary measures against ordinary judges, see Miasto #owicz
(C-558/18); Prokuratura Okr#gowa w P#ocku (C-563/18); Prokuratura Rejonowa
w S#ubicach (C-623/18). Some of them are subject to disciplinary measures
for the sole reason of launching a preliminary reference concerning the internal
organisation of the Polish judiciary (see e.g. the accounts of Iustitia, Themis and the
Helsinki Foundation). In light of these developments, a firm response of the Court
establishing a solid legal framework for violations of Article 2 TEU seems therefore
more urgent than ever.
ASJP was already a huge step in this direction. But as András Jakab noted so
concisely: “a usual method for expanding judicial competences is to establish the
competence but not to use it … The next step … is the establishment of a violation.”
And this “next step” – this time a veritable stepping stone towards a strong “Union of
values” – does not seem far away.
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